Introduction
For the past few decades, international macroeconomics has postulated the Over the recent years, it has become clear that monetary policy conducted by large central banks can have serious spillover effects on other countries, and that global financial integration can make monetary policy less independent in general. Rey (2015) argues that (lending) conditions of global financial institutions, as well as credit growth and capital flows, are largely driven by the global financial cycle, which in turn is mostly determined by monetary policy of the major central banks. This leads her to argue that rather than the classical tri lemma (exchange rate control, free capital mobility, and independent monetary policy) we are dealing with a di lemma: independent monetary policy is only possible with some capital controls ("cross-border flows and leverage of global institutions transmit monetary conditions globally, even under floating exchange-rate regimes").
In this paper we argue that, although spillovers are indeed considerable, central banks of small open economies are still able to affect their domestic yield curve, especially shortto medium-term rates.
We first investigate the spillover effects of monetary policy and communication from the European Central Bank (ECB) on asset prices of small open economies. We use high frequency identification (HFI) to identify shocks in monetary policy and communication, and analyse the effects of these shocks on asset prices and yields in three small open economies that are comparable and highly integrated with the European (Monetary) Union: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These are interesting cases, as they have varying degrees of integration and monetary policy independence: Denmark is a member of the European Union and has an exchange rate peg to the euro (and hence cannot have independent monetary policy), Sweden is a member of the European Union but has its own floating currency, and Norway is not a member and has a floating currency as well.
We further investigate whether finding spillovers implies that domestic monetary policy has become ineffective, as the "dilemma" paradigm would suggest, and find that this is only partially the case.
The U.S. and the euro area account for approximately 40 percent of world GDP. In is dominated by studies looking at spillovers from the Fed to emerging market economies (e.g. Takats and Vela (2014) , Chen et al. (2014) , Tillmann (2016) , Gilchrist et al. (2018)) and between advanced economies (e.g. Ehrmann et al. (2011) , Rogers et al. (2016) , Bauer and Neely (2014) , Neely (2015) ). 2 Furthermore, Burriel and Galesi (2018) , Georgiadis (2015) and Leombroni et al. (2017) , find that ECB's monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, have heterogeneous effects on countries within the euro area. The literature on the effect of ECB's monetary policy and communication shocks on non-euro area countries, however, is scarce. Exceptions are Falagiarda et al. (2015) and Potjagailo (2017) . The former, closest in methodology to this paper, show that spillovers occur from ECB's unconventional monetary policy to yields in non-euro area countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The latter investigates euro area monetary policy spillovers to 14 European non-euro area countries by means of a factor-augmented VAR, and finds that spillovers are large, with the strongest effects for countries with fixed exchange rates.
In this paper we focus on financial variables. Financial variables respond instantly to surprise changes in monetary policy and are typically seen as a starting point of the transmission mechanism initiated by a monetary policy decision, and as indicators of the effect on economic variables. Earlier studies (e.g. Canova (2005) , Kim (2001), Feldkircher and Huber (2016) ) have found that for US monetary policy, the financial channel (i.e. through interest rates) is the most important spillover channel. Moreover, we look at both spillovers from conventional measures and from ECB communication. 3 Brand et al. (2010) find that market expectations for the path of monetary policy change considerably during the press conference following a key policy rate decision by the ECB.
We distinguish between a key policy rate surprise and a communication surprise using high frequency identification (HFI) techniques. 4 We adopt the methodology of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , who apply factor analysis on several U.S. money market instruments to identify two factors of the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) monetary policy and their impact on U.S. equity prices and interest rates. 5 Similarly, from a set of interest rate surprises that together explain the actions and statements of the ECB's monetary policy, we extract two factors. At least prior to the ECB's introduction of asset purchases, these two factors can be interpreted as a policy rate ("target") surprise and a communication ("path") surprise. After the ECB started its asset purchasing programmes, however, the second factor represents a combination of communication about future policy intentions (forward guidance) and communication about asset purchases.
After identifying the policy shocks, we study their impact on small open economies in two steps. First, we analyse the spillovers of such policies on interest rates and asset prices in two small open economies that have close ties to, but are not part of, the euro area: Norway and Sweden. Although these countries are economically and financially integrated with the euro area, they have their own independent monetary policy regimes, in the form of inflation targeting. We compare spillover effects in these countries with a comparable country that has an exchange rate peg to the euro: Denmark. Our findings suggest that both factors have strong and significant effects on small open economies that are close to the euro area. Whereas the spillover effects of policy rate surprises die out quickly, the effect of ECB's communication is very persistent, and may therefore also 3 Two studies should be mentioned that focus specifically on spillovers from ECB's unconventional monetary policy. Fratzscher et al. (2016) use daily data on international equity returns and portfolio flows to shed light on the financial market impact of unconventional policies between 2007 and 2012. Georgiadis and Gräb (2016) employ an event-study methodology to estimate announcement effects of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP).
4 Several papers have assessed responses to monetary policy shocks in a HFI framework, see e.g. Campbell et al. (2012) , Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , Hamilton (2008) , Hanson and Stein (2015) , and Swanson (2017) . 5 Brubakk et al. (2017) apply this methodology to Norwegian and Swedish data.
affect real economic variables in these countries.
Finally, we investigate the impact and persistence of domestic policy shocks. We find that domestic monetary policy and communication surprises are effective in moving market rates, and that their effects are more persistent than their European counterparts.
However, effects of domestic communication are less persistent than those of ECB communication, particularly for the medium to long end of the yield curve. Based on this, we conclude that although spillover effects from ECB monetary policy and communication are strong, they do not imply that small open economies need capital controls in order to have autonomous monetary policies. In other words, the "trilemma" is still alive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data.
Section 3 provides an overview of the applied identification methods. The empirical analysis and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Data
We analyse intraday data on a variety of Norwegian In the rest of the paper, we refer to those as "unconventional monetary policy" (UMP).
In the factor analysis in section 3.2, we use European OIS rates for one, three, six, nine, 12, 18, and 24 months. 9 In robustness tests we also include the five-and ten-year 6 We choose not to start earlier as Rosa and Verga (2008) show that it took market participants until 2001 to learn about the credibility of the ECB. Moreover, the ECB only held press conferences for every second rate decision in 2001.
7 The decision to keep rates unchanged is also considered a decision. 8 Of these asset purchase programmes, the first two were targeted mostly at countries for which their financial market malfunctioning was disturbing the transmission of monetary policy.
9 European OIS contracts are fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps where the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) is the floating leg interbank rate, i.e. the weighted average of the interest rates on German Treasury bonds.
In order to evaluate spillovers on small open economies, we make use of a wide variety of financial derivatives contracts that reflect short-, medium and long term interest rates, including money market rates up to one year (FRAs), and interest rate swaps with maturities of two, five and ten years. We use swap rates rather than government bond yields due to the low volume and poor liquidity of the Norwegian bond market in particular. The FRA market is regarded as the most liquid part of the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish money markets. The FRA contracts reflect the short to medium end of the yield curve, while the swap contracts reflect the expected average short-term interest rates over the two-, five-, and ten-year horizons. 10 We include the first to fourth quarter FRA contracts. These contracts capture the three-month interest rate in one to four quarters out. We also apply the factor analysis from Section 3.2 in order to analyse the effects of domestic monetary policy shocks. For equity prices, we use data for the OSEBX (Norwegian) and OMX (C-Danish and S-Swedish) equity indices.
Variables are obtained from 5-minute frequency observations from the Thomson Reuters Tick History database. The data are aggregated from tick-by-tick data, which means that the observation at the time of the ECB policy decision press release, at 1:45 p.m., is the latest tick before that exact time (e.g. a tick quote from a dealer at 1:44:58 p.m.). 11
Identification

High frequency identification
In line with Kuttner (2001) and Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , among others, we identify the key policy rate surprise by using an interest rate instrument that covers expectations about the short-term monetary policy stance. Potential instruments consist of overnight overnight unsecured transactions for the panel banks (http://www.emmi-benchmarks.eu/euribor-eoniaorg/about-eonia.html).
10 Forward rate agreements are over-the-counter (OTC) cash settled agreements to exchange fixed interest rate and reference rate (NIBOR) payments on a notional amount of NOK 1 million. An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to swap interest rate payments where the buyer pays a fixed rate (swap rate) and the seller pays the floating for a pre-determined period. 11 We deal with missing observations by assuming that such NaN observations mean that there is no change from the previous non-NaN observation.
index swaps (OIS) and futures rates with maturities shorter than the time between two ECB monetary policy meetings. As there is no futures market for the ECB key policy rate, we use OIS rates. At the day of the ECB monetary policy meeting, if t is some time after the policy rate announcement and t − j is right before the announcement,
t−j is assumed to be the unexpected part of the ECB policy rate decision.
Since the sample start, the ECB key policy rate decision has been announced at 1:45 p.m., followed by a press conference 45 minutes later, at 2:30 p.m. 12 We define the full announcement window as the time window from 1:30 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., containing both the press release and the press conference. Thus, our full data set consists of observations for this event window for all ECB monetary policy meeting dates over the sample period.
Factor analysis using principal components
Through its monetary policy announcements the ECB provides information about the current rate decision, as well as the economic outlook, including future monetary policy. Therefore, changes in market rates around the time of these announcements may not only contain a policy rate surprise component, but also a component related to the ECB's communication about the future (forward guidance). Since we are interested in all dimensions of the monetary policy shocks, we need to employ methods to separate the two components. Following Gürkaynak et al. (2005) we apply principal component analysis on interest rate changes around the ECB's monetary policy announcements to extract the two components that together explain most of the variation in these rates around policy announcements. In order to extract the factors, we use data on interest rate changes of maturities up to ten years. This can be represented by:
where X is a T ×n matrix of T = 185 ECB key policy rate announcements and n = 7
European financial variables: the one-month, three-month, six-month, nine-month, one-
year, 18-month and two-year European OIS rates. 13 F denotes a T ×k matrix of the unobserved factors with k < n, and Λ is a k×n matrix of factor loadings. η represents white noise error terms. Each element of X is the change in one of the n variables for the full announcement window. Using principal component analysis on X, we extract the unobserved factors F .
The Cragg-Donald test rejects the hypothesis of more than two factors at the 5% level.
Hence, the test implies that in addition to the policy rate surprise, one factor is enough to explain variation in European interest rates within the full announcement window.
Furthermore, to provide a more structural interpretation of the factors, we follow Gürkaynak et al. (2005) (GSS) and rotate the two extracted factors F 1 and F 2 into a new set of factors denoted Z 1 and Z 2 . 14 The most important identifying restriction is that a communication surprise should move interest rates with maturities beyond the current policy meeting, but should not at all be related to the surprise in the current policy rate. In other words, only the first rotated factor, Z 1 , should load onto the interest rate with the shortest maturity (i.e. the one-month OIS rate, which is the first coloumn of X), which is the monetary policy surprise (target factor to use the notation of GSS),
whereas the second rotated factor, Z 2 , should not have any relation with the one-month European OIS. Consequently, Z 1 may be interpreted as the policy rate surprise of the ECB announcement, and Z 2 may be interpreted as all other information in the ECB announcement that changes financial market expectations about the future path of key policy rates (Swanson (2017) ). In short, we denote the factor as the path factor (as in GSS), which, for the UMP sample, is likely to be a representation of both communication and UMP effects.
Finally, to facilitate the interpretation of the rotated factors, Z 1 is rescaled such that it moves one-for-one with the surprise component of the key policy rate setting (measured as the change in one-month OIS), and hence can be interpreted as basis points surprise changes in the one-month OIS. In addition, Z 2 is rescaled such that it can be interpreted 13 The one-month OIS rate provides a good estimate of the market expectation of the ECB's key policy rates for the closest upcoming Governing Council meetings. For robustness tests we expand X with five-year and ten-year German Treasury yields.
14 The computational details of this factor rotation, can be found in the appendix of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) .
as basis points change in the one-year OIS, in line with Leombroni et al. (2017) .
Rather than displaying the loadings of the rotated factors, we show the results of regressing the input variables (X) on a constant and the two rotated and rescaled factors. Table 1 reports the results. The coefficients can be interpreted as the loadings of the extracted factors, and the R 2 reflects how important the variable in X is for the factors Z 1 and Z 2 . The results imply that the overall effects of a policy rate surprise (target factor) is strongest for the shortest maturities and dies out for longer maturities, consistent with theory (key policy rates affect the short end of the yield curve). Moreover, the path factor, Z 2 , has a characteristic hump-shape with strongest effects on European interest rates with maturities of about one-and-a-half to two years. 15 When the X matrix also consists of surprises in five and ten year German Treasury yields, the largest coefficient can be observed for the five year rate. Figure 1 plots the two rotated factors over the sample period. An interesting aspect is that the factors do not necessarily move in the same direction, which implies that different surprise components of the ECB announcements may influence interest rates in opposite directions.
To evaluate the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy surprises, we use the shocks as computed in Brubakk et al. (2017) . 15 Recall that, by construction, Z 2 has no effect on the one-month OIS. 
Empirical analysis and results
Now that we have identified the policy shocks, we study their impact on small open economies. We zoom in on two small open economies that have close ties to, but are not part of, the euro area: Norway and Sweden, and compare the results to a comparable country that has an exchange rate peg to the euro: Denmark.
Interest rates and asset prices in Norway, Sweden and Denmark
In order to examine the spillovers of ECB's target and path factors on interest rates and asset prices of small open economies, we run the following regression:
where ∆R t,i is the observed change in the Norwegian/Swedish/Danish interest rate or (log) asset price of interest for the time window considered, Z 1,t represents the target factor, and Z 2,t is the (rescaled and rotated) path factor, representing the forward guidance/UMP surprise.
The results are presented in Norwegian and Swedish financial markets are indeed affected by unexpected changes in the ECB's policy rate setting, and the re-pricing happens very fast after the new information has been received. As expected, the short and medium end of the yield curve respond more strongly to the target factor than the longer-term interest rate instruments.
The results further show that the path factor has strongest effects for the medium and longer-term interest rates, while the shortest end of the yield curve is not affected to the same extent. The estimates show a characteristic hump-shape, with a peak around 18-24 months. These findings are in line with what Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , Swanson (2017) and Brubakk et al. (2017) find for domestic effects of respectively U.S., and Norwegian and Swedish central bank communication.
The size of the spillovers are sizeable For Norwegian and Swedish rates, but not as large as for Denmark. Interestingly, the impact of ECB's monetary policy starts to be similar for Swedish and Danish rates from the two to five year maturity, and the impact of ECB's path factor on the ten year swap rate is virtually the same for Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.
We can also see that Norwegian equity prices are affected by a target surprise, whereas there is no significant effect on Swedish or Danish equity prices. The sign is as expected:
interest rates are used to discount future cash flows, higher interest rates implying a higher discounting rate, and hence higher rates lead to lower equity prices. Explicitly, following an unexpected ECB policy rate increase of ten basis points, the Norwegian stock market index is estimated to fall by 0.25%. 16
Subsequently, we investigate whether international transmission of ECB's monetary policy has changed since the ECB introduced asset purchases as part of their unconventional monetary policy tools on May 10, 2010. The results are presented in Tables 3 to 5 for Norwegian, Swedish and Danish variables, respectively. For Norway and Sweden, the results for the target factor are virtually the same for the pre-UMP and UMP periods.
The path factor also provides very similar estimates for the two sample periods for the short end of the yield curve. In fact, we cannot observe any structural differences for the period in which the ECB started unconventional monetary policy. In the case of Denmark, both the target and path factor have a significantly smaller effect on the first forward rate agreement after the ECB starts their unconventional monetary policies.
Furthermore, some sub-sample differences can be seen for the Norwegian stock market.
Whereas the full sample results show a small negative impact of monetary policy surprises on the Norwegian stock index, the path factor only has an effect after 2010. This is in line with the ECB's communication during that period. Campbell et al. (2012) define
Delphic and Odyssean forward guidance. Whereas Odyssean forward guidance implies a commitment from the central bank to deviate from its 'normal' conduct of monetary policy, and therefore affects real economic outcomes, Delphic forward guidance mostly informs the public about the central bank's stance on the state of the economy. They argue that these should therefore not affect real economic outcomes. As the ECB's communication can be classified as Delphic in the early sample, and rather Odyssean in the latter sample, we expect a stronger path effect in the later sample. In the latter sample, asset purchases may have also caused portfolio rebalancing towards Norwegian assets.
In sum, ECB's current and expected future monetary policy surprises have substantial and statistically significant effects on interest rates and asset prices in two developed small open economies that have close ties to, but are not part of, the euro area. The magnitude of these effects is quite similar for Norway and Sweden, and smaller than for Denmark.
Finally, there are only minor sub-sample differences. We will now look at the persistence of interest rate spillovers.
Persistence on interest rates
Given the use of relatively small event windows to identify the target and path factors, as well as their effects, it is unclear whether the results we find are persistent. This is important for their transmission mechanism: if the spillover effects die out quickly, it is unlikely that they will have real economic effects. We therefore follow the methodology proposed by Swanson (2017) to gauge the persistence of monetary policy and communication surprises by using a simplified version of Jorda's method of 'local projections' (Jordà (2005) ). In particular, this implies running regressions of the form:
Where R t+h denotes the daily change in variable R from day t to day h, and Z 1,t and Z s,t denote the target and path factors, respectively. Effectively, by running this regression for values of h ranging from zero to 29, we obtain the effect these shocks have on asset prices between announcement day and 30 days thereafter. Subsequently, we plot these 30 coefficients together with 95% confidence bands for Norwegian, Swedish and Danish financial variables for both factors. From Figures 2 -5 , we can see that the longer the horizon of the interest rate (i.e. the further out on the yield curve), the more important and persistent ECB's path surprises are for Norway and Sweden. Furthermore, whereas we find some (persistence of) spillovers from ECB monetary policy surprises to Norwegian rates, this is barely the case for Sweden. Spillovers from ECB's path factor are stronger for Sweden than for Norway though. ECB's target factor has a stronger and more persistent effect on Danish rates, although they do not survive the somewhat strict test for significance. The effect of the path factor is stronger for Danish rates than for Norwegian rates, but has a very similar effect for Swedish rates.
Robustness of factor specification
We show that our results are robust to the exact specification of factor input variables.
Results are qualitatively the same, and quantitatively very similar. Table 6 shows the correlation between the various ways of extracting the factors. Correlations are very high. We have tested two different variations: expanding the factor input variable set with German Treasuries of five and ten year maturity (Table 7) , and extracting the factors for two different subsamples (pre-UMP and UMP; see tables in Appendix for full results). Note: This table shows correlations between the target (path) factor extracted in three different ways: over the full sample versus over two sub-samples for input variables up to two years (correlation in column 2) or up to ten years (correlation in column 3), and with input variables up to two versus up to ten years for the full sample (column 4).
Effectiveness of domestic monetary policy in Norway and Sweden
Finally, to be able to further link ECB spillovers with domestic monetary policy effectiveness, we examine the results of Brubakk et al. (2017) . In their paper, they extract a target and path factor from Norwegian and Swedish interest rate changes around monetary policy announcements of the Norwegian (Norges Bank) and Swedish (Sveriges Riksbank) central banks. Their sample is slightly different than ours: they use interest rate instruments up to one year (forward rate agreements instead of OIS rates), and their sample period runs from 2001 to 2016. However, in the previous section we have showed that our results are robust to the exact sample specification. The event window is also slightly shorter, but as for our ECB event window, captures exactly the monetary policy announcement and subsequent press conference. 17
Results are shown in Table 8 . Comparing the size of the coefficients, we can see that the effects of domestic target surprises (columns 2 for Norway and 6 for Sweden) are much stronger than of ECB's target surprises ( Domestic target and path surprises have a significant effect on the longer end of the yield curve (five to ten years), but these effects are less strong than the spillover effects from the ECB. Control over the domestic yield curve therefore seems to diminish for the long end of the yield curve. Finally, whereas Norwegian equity prices move in response to ECB target surprises, they do not move in response to domestic monetary policy. The opposite is the case for Sweden: domestic monetary policy affects the Swedish equity market, but ECB's monetary policy does not.
17 Note that the results are slightly different from those presented in their paper, as they display the results for daily event windows. However, results for event windows of 90 minutes (15 minutes before and 75 minutes after the announcement) are also available. We use these results for better comparability to the ECB spillover results.
18 Note that we cannot compare the size of the path factor, as the (re)scaling of that factor in Brubakk et al. (2017) is different from our method. Our results stress the need to consider spillovers from communication. Whereas the effects of policy rate surprises often fade within a few days, the effects of communication are much more persistent, and as such more likely to influence real economic variables in the affected countries. 
